The deal to open up Ukraine’s Black Sea ports, brokered by the United Nations and Turkey, is expected to facilitate export of several millions tonnes of grain and potentially ease an international food crisis.
However, less than a day after the deal was signed, Russia undermined international confidence with missile strikes on the port of Odesa.
The deal, signed July 22, is significant for Moscow on the diplomatic front. Russia is trying to present itself as benevolent, since the agreement is considered by the UN as a ground-breaking positive step.
Five months into the war, analysts and officials acknowledge Russia’s strategic failure and growing inability to increase pressure on Ukraine. But Moscow, which is running out of options, still has a card to play in the Black Sea.
Putin is now trying to portray Russia in a positive light by agreeing to a safe corridor to export agricultural products. Whether and how this materializes in the coming weeks remains to be seen.
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Before commercial shipping can resume, several issues have to be resolved, most notably in regard to clearing mines and the overall safety of shipping operations.
The corridor will need weeks, at the very least, to be fully operational. In the meantime, Russia’s behaviour will be closely scrutinized.
Under the agreed deal, commercial ships will be monitored under a joint co-ordination centre with representatives from the UN, Turkey, Ukraine and Russia. This gives Moscow some form of legitimacy.
The grain deal remains crucial. It is the best option to alleviate the world food crisis. The onus is now on Russia to honour its pledge, but given Moscow’s poor record of truth telling and respect for international law, trust remains fragile.
In the initial phase of war (February to March), Russia occupied Snake Island and deployed its Black Sea fleet, by far the strongest regional naval force, to secure control of the northwestern Black Sea. The smaller and under-resourced Ukrainian navy was in no position to oppose the Russians at sea, and no other navies got involved to avoid escalation.
With its operational control of the northwestern Black Sea, Russia could use kilo-class submarines in support of the air campaign against Ukraine. Russia could also threaten an amphibious assault on Odesa, keeping Ukrainian forces tied up on a possible defence.
However, in April and May the situation at sea shifted in favour of Ukraine. The sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva exposed an important weakness of the Russian navy in terms of air defence. It showed Russian forces were not safe when operating close to the Ukrainian coast, due to Kyiv’s land-based anti-ship missiles.
That said, the Russian navy has been able to pose enough danger to maritime travel that it was too risky for shipping companies to operate in the area.
From an operational perspective, sending naval forces to escort civilian shipping to and from Ukraine is feasible. However, such a deployment would likely violate part of the Montreux Convention and have potential to alienate Turkey. This could also result in combat with Russian naval forces and further escalation.
Alternatives that do not require Russia’s consent and co-operation include using smaller ports on the Danube River and ports in Romania (requiring road transportation) or delivering grain by train to the EU, and then to other ports globally. This might not be a sustainable long-term option.
As the war drags on, Russia is finding it difficult to mobilize more land forces and has a shortage of land-attack missiles. And after losing control over Snake Island, Moscow is unable to fully control the approaches to Odesa, although the Russian navy still poses a substantial threat.
These factors can partly explain Moscow’s change of strategy regarding the blockade. What’s more, as the food crisis drags on, Russia is risking its political and diplomatic credibility in Africa and Asia as its responsibility for the food crisis becomes obvious.
So far, Russia has been able to exploit the food crisis to its advantage. Putin tried to blackmail the West into easing sanctions in exchange for facilitating agricultural exports. At the same time, Moscow has managed through its usual propaganda to limit criticism from developing countries outside Europe.
Political and diplomatic confrontation between the West and Russia is at a turning point. Russia is trying to compensate for its strategic failures with a diplomatic success.
It is crucial for the West to oppose Putin’s blackmailing strategy and to stay firm in regard to sanctions, which are having some effect. It is also crucial to counter Russian propaganda in “swing states” such as India, Pakistan, Brazil and Indonesia.
Missile strikes on Odesa must be condemned and alternative ways of exporting Ukrainian grain must be pursued. At the same time, the West must do everything possible to make the grain deal work.
The food crisis is affecting millions of people and is a humanitarian and diplomatic battle that the West cannot afford to lose.
– Basil Germond is a professor of seapower and maritime security in the department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University.
