Paul’s love of his farm, his family and his home province of Saskatchewan were evident in his columns, as was his conviction that farmers and rural people could be better off by working together. He was an early and strong advocate for farmers to work together to operate short line railways, and one of his recent columns observed how successful they had been in Saskatchewan but not in other provinces. That was probably in no small way due to his own hard work and passion.

Paul also understood what farms in the middle of the Prairies mean to the rest of the world, and world events mean to them. Above all, he understood the importance of food, and how that despite the trials and tribulations of farming on the Prairies, the life here is blessed in comparison to that of so many others less fortunate. That was evident in his last column, number 725, which appears below.

Paul is survived by his wife Faye, his sisters Dolores (Ken), Rita (Bill), Cathy (Lawrence), and Virginia, his children Naomi (Dan), Chris (Brenda), Kate, and their mother Laura, and his sons James (Carolyn), and David. Funeral services were scheduled for Thursday in Claybank, Sask. Family asks that donations in Paul’s name be made to Amnesty International or Development and Peace.

The World Food Program, an agency of the United Nations, has announced that the number of hungry people in the world rose this year to over one billion. It is a startling number. It says that, though the world continues to grow richer in many senses and for many people, it is growing poorer at supplying more of its citizens with food.

This is not the way it was supposed to be, not the way it was from 1990 to 2005. In that time period, poverty (extreme poverty) in developing countries fell steadily. Around 2005, this reversed, and poverty, and with it hunger, began to rise again. This has continued unabated.

The large increase in hunger in the first half of 2009 has been blamed by the World Food Program on continuing high food prices, but it has been much longer in the making than the commodity boom that arose from the banking crisis in the U. S. last year. Like the market crash and subprime mortgage mess, hunger in poor countries has been caused in many cases by actions taken in rich ones.

Until recently, international agencies like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the U. S. Treasury Department promoted policies that came to be known as the Washington Consensus. These policies became requirements for countries that wanted loans from the World Bank and IMF. The American government and governments in Europe also demanded that countries wanting to receive aid follow the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus. Key among these were trade liberalization, privatization of state enterprises and deregulation.

One of the results of the Washington Consensus was that spending on agriculture by poor countries declined. This was often demanded as a condition for aid and loans. Meanwhile, the amount of money given by rich countries for the development of agriculture in poor countries also declined. While imposing these restrictions on underdeveloped nations, the U. S. and the European Union continued to provide ample subsidies to their own agriculture sectors. It was fully expected that poor countries would be able to buy their food needs on international markets while switching their economies over to export-oriented agriculture and industries. They would export flowers to us and we would export food to them.

The result was that the food-producing capacity of many poor countries declined. Agr icul tural research and infrastructure were neglected and subsistence farmers were pushed aside for oilseed plantations and other export crops.

In 2007-08, food prices began to rise as a long period of declining food stocks worldwide suddenly got noticed. On top of that, the economic collapse in many developed countries reduced markets for the production of the poor. They could no longer afford to eat.

TWO SUCCESSES

Some world governments continue to prescribe more of the same as the cure for hunger and poverty – more trade, more deregulation and more privatization. But here is the odd thing. Two of the largest and poorest countries in the world have reduced poverty to a greater extent than any, and they did it while violating most of the principles of the Washington Consensus. I’m talking, of course, about India and China. Both countries resisted privatization of government services, continued to protect their own economies with tariffs and did not make deregulation the be-all and end-all of political policy.

So what’s to be done? We have rapidly increasing hunger at a time when rich countries are preoccupied with their own economic troubles, like whether we’ll be able to keep all the Hummers on the road. With troubles like that, how will they have time to think about the hungry in far-off lands?

Various international agencies have proposed some solutions. These include

Increasing aid to agriculture in poor countries and targeting it at appropriate production that will meet the needs of rural and urban poor.

Building food reserves, like India and China did, that can be released at times when supply is low and prices high. This will prevent price volatility.

Tighten regulations on exchanges that trade in commodities to prevent excessive speculation.

Negotiate trade agreements that allow poor countries to protect their economies in times of crisis and exploitation.

Control the market power of massive corporations that can cause markets to swing on their whim.

Of course these measures run counter to the laissez-faire economic policies promoted by the world’s major powers. But in the current economic crisis, they are precisely what is needed. Having caused the problem to a great extent with the failed policies of the Washington Consensus, rich nations bear some responsibility toward the poor.

In the short term we need to alleviate the hunger that is pressing down on one billion people. Nor is the cost significant compared to what we are currently showering on our own economies. Less than one per cent of the global stimulus package would fund the current deficit in the World Food Program.

We should not underestimate the value of living in a world where hunger is eliminated. As someone pointed out, any country is only four missed meals away from anarchy. And anarchy that strikes in one country often has ramifications for another half a world away.

The post Paul Beingessner — A Love Of Farming And Concern For Others appeared first on Manitoba Co-operator.

The real lesson came in what happened in the United States. Canadian beef constituted a small amount of the beef consumed in the U. S., something less than three per cent. To Canada, obviously, the amount was huge. To the U. S., not so much. But cattle prices in the U. S. skyrocketed. Farmers were getting record-high prices for their calves, and this continued for some time. The lesson was in the major impact a small change in supply could have on a market fairly well balanced.

It is a lesson that has apparently been forgotten (if it was ever learned) by some Canadian grain producers. These are the people moaning that prices for durum wheat at elevators in the United States in the 2008-09 crop year have been higher than the CWB Pool Return Outlook for durum Western Canada. So we have the vice-president of the Western Canadian Wheat Growers berating the CWB, claiming it is “costing farmers a bundle.”

No doubt there is such a thing as wilful ignorance, but it is hard to believe that Stephen Vandervalk actually believes his own rhetoric. He should know, for example, that the CWB sells only a small proportion of western Canadian durum to the United States in any given year. This crop year, the U. S. has taken about one-sixth of our durum. The entire U. S. durum market amounts to about half of our production. So if Vandervalk could have his way, and start madly trucking his durum across the border to those American elevators, and if all, or even a significant number of Canadian farmers did the same, it would be mad cow in reverse. The huge increase in supply would cause prices to crash faster than you could say, “Geez, how dumb was that?”

Of course, comparing American elevator prices to the pooled CWB price is screwy logic anyway. Five-sixths of our durum goes to countries other than the U. S. Freight costs to get it there are much higher, involving both domestic rail and ocean shipping. Countries like Morocco and Algeria typically don’t pay what richer countries do, so the pooled price reflects a mix of these low and high prices.

To top it off, the CWB has been selling to the U. S. at prices that are higher than the elevator prices Vandervalk is so determined he could get. If he had his way, and crashed the U. S. price, everyone would be a loser.

The other major complaint from the Wheat Growers is that the CWB has not taken all the durum farmers have grown. This crop year, it will be about 80 per cent. This reflects that fact that the market for durum worldwide is finite. Humans only consume so much pasta, couscous, chapati and bulgar. Push more durum onto world markets than the world will consume and it will be sold at feed prices. The problem with this is that durum customers will see durum selling as feed and will reduce their expectations of what they must pay.

American farmers should actually be quite happy with the CWB. By refusing to flood world markets with cheap durum, it has held the price up for farmers on both sides of the border. In a completely open market, price signals for planting durum would come from the dropping prices as farmers pushed too much durum onto the market. With the CWB, the price signal is the fact that we can’t sell all our production. Farmers in my area know this. Durum has been a profitable crop with price premiums over Red Spring wheat virtually every year. But we also know we can’t plant every acre to durum. In the case of durum, the Wheat Growers seem to lack fundamental understanding of how markets work.

Paul Beingessner writes from his farm near Truax, Sask.

The post Rushing Madly Off In All Directions appeared first on Manitoba Co-operator.

I thought about this the other day when I was discussing farm animals with my three-year-old grandson. He had seen cows, he told me, and horses and dogs, cats, chickens and sheep. But he had never seen a pig. Pictures yes, and the little piggies on the ends of his feet, but not a real live hog.

And, living in Saskatchewan, I reminded his parents, he wouldn’t be likely to see one. I couldn’t think of anyone in this area who raises hogs the way my father, and most of his neighbours did four decades ago. The closest thing to a hog around here is the odour that drifts in occasionally on the south wind from the huge complex of barns 20-odd miles south of here. And if I did want to take him there to see a pig, we would be unlikely to make it past the biosecurity layer around the barns.

As I said, there used to be lots of hogs raised on diversified farms in the Prairie region. Pigs had the title of mortgage lifters. Many farmers were in and out of pigs frequently. It was easy to ramp up numbers when prices were high, since pigs reproduce early, often and with large litters. It was just as easy to reduce numbers to a minimum when prices were low. Hence the notion of the four-year hog cycle.

When factory hog farms came along, the dynamic changed. Instead of reducing production in times of low prices, they doggedly kept on churning out pigs. They had to do something to cover their huge fixed costs. Prices responded by sinking and remaining low. Toss in the occasional closed border due to real or imagined disease threats, and hog farms have lost vast sums of money for over a decade. Of course, the low prices that battered the huge hog barns destroyed the little ones. Hogs disappeared from the Prairie landscape, to be sequestered in massive, sealed complexes.

No doubt the state of the industry is a surprise to many in government and elsewhere who saw factory hog production as another tool in the belt of rural development. Fifteen to 20 years ago, government bureaucrats and agricultural economists were lauding the development of the massive hog operation. Saskatchewan, we were told, would soon be producing three million hogs per year. Markets were expanding worldwide. Canada, especially the Prairies, had the lowest production costs in the world. We only had to build them, fill them, and prosperity would come.

The early barns looked good. What the public seldom knew was that they were propped up by government subsidies for everything from water development to building construction. Almost all of those early barns are gone now, and gone are the community dollars that poured into the pockets of the early entrepreneurs. The government of Saskatchewan still owns huge hunks of one hog empire, and loans from many years ago remain unpaid for many barns. These loans were to be repaid when profitability returned. Profitability remains elusive.

The truth is, we were never a particularly low-cost producer. American corn always had us beat. And every hog added to our inventory had to be exported, with most of these going to the U. S., to a country already a huge exporter itself. Other countries, with cheaper and more plentiful labour, were also increasing production. It isn’t surprising then, that it took the bubble only a decade and a half to burst.

Now, hog farmers across Canada have asked the government for a billion dollars in ad hoc payments to drag them through the worst crisis they’ve faced. What urban Canadians won’t know is just how few people actually raise hogs. They also won’t know that there is no light at the end of the hog tunnel, only a lot of desperate people hoping for a miracle.

Driving 25 miles south of Regina last week, I got a huge surprise. Rooting around by some wooden granaries near the road was a herd of footloose pigs, older sows by the look of them. I have no idea where they came from, or where they went. But as I went by, I gave them the thumbs up. At least for a short while, they were the only lucky ones in a sad industry.

Paul Beingessner writes from his farm near Truax, Sask.

The post Dying Hog Industry Asks For A Billion appeared first on Manitoba Co-operator.

Readers will also know that I lambasted some of the groups claiming to represent cattle producers for their unwillingness to oppose the consolidation in the industry. One such representative defended this by saying that the packers (XL and Cargill) write good cheques, so why would we criticize them? (They may be good but they are so darn small!)

The columns I wrote about this brought me probably the largest response since I began writing, more than 700 columns ago. While some of it was negative, most was positive. There are a lot of angry cattle farmers out there. Angry at governments, and angry at the leadership of farm organizations.

SURPRISED

One large cow-calf producer who phoned me surprised me a bit when he said that now that XL was going to own Lakeside Packers, it would soon close XL Beef in Moose Jaw, and likely its plant in Calgary. Even for someone as jaded as me, that seemed a bit much. “Of course,” he said. “Lakeside is operating below capacity, so why would they keep the other two plants open?”

Geez, what a cynic, I thought. But, of course, it turns out he was right. XL announced on April 24 that it is “temporarily” shutting the Moose Jaw plant down, with a likely resumption of operations in September. One employee was less optimistic, saying the September reopening was more a wish than a likelihood.

Neither the Canadian Cattlemens Association and the Saskatchewan Stock Growers Association appeared upset with Nilsson Bros., owners of XL. CCA president Brad Wildeman said, “If there’s nothing to slaughter, you can’t expect to keep it open.” SSGA president Ed Bothner was equally sympathetic. “It’s out of their control.” Even the head of the union at XL bought the argument. “Who would think in Saskatchewan we’d have no cows?”

BELOW CAPACITY

Since the plant at Brooks has been operating at about 75 per cent capacity, and Moose Jaw has had a reduced kill lately, the logical assumption is there just aren’t enough cattle to go around. Of course, during BSE, with the border closed, prices were low because there wasn’t enough slaughter capacity in Canada to kill all the animals available. Now that the border is open, (at least for now) cattle are again heading to the U. S. and Canadian plants are short.

The thing about this is that cattle are being shipped to the U. S. In other words, there are more cattle available to kill, but someone else, in the U. S. is willing to pay more for them than the Canadian plants. So there is something to slaughter, and it isn’t out of XL’s control. Just pay more and you’ll have more cattle. And the cow numbers in Saskatchewan are down, all right, but only a bit over two per cent from six months ago. There are still cows in Saskatchewan.

And, if there are less cattle overall, it is because farmers stopped raising them, and began to sell off their cows because there was no money in it. Let’s face it.

SHORT-TERM THINKING

The packers made a killing during BSE. If they had passed more of that back to the farmer, there would be more cows now, and no one would be talking about shortages of animals. So the packers are victims of a problem of their own making.

Now, I know that the market doesn’t work that way. The packers will never pay more than they have to, because they are business people, not charitable institutions, and they mainly think short term. To get money out of them, we need to have competition. That is the nature of our economic system. Rob Leslie, senior analyst at Canfax, knows that. He is quoted as saying the closure will mean lower prices for feeders and fat cattle. “We’re reducing capacity and the plants don’t have to go out there and be quite as aggressive on their bids to procure cattle.”

Now if XL had not been allowed to buy Lakeside, and another buyer had been found, would Moose Jaw have closed anyway? Maybe. Or maybe not, since it is expected there will be more cattle available in the fall.

So tell me again why the cattle organizations figure consolidation in the packing industry is okay. I haven’t had a good laugh in quite a while.

Paul Beingessner writes from his farm near Truax, Sask.

The post Cattle Producer Predicted XL Closure appeared first on Manitoba Co-operator.

There is seldom enough money available in moving grain on branch lines to afford extensive services from outside contractors.

Nobody likes rain on the day of a parade. And so the metaphor about raining on someone’s parade is pretty apt. You don’t get to be the crowd favourite if you’re disrespecting an idea the crowd cherishes.

So I write this column with some hesitation, because the parade I am going to sprinkle on is getting lots of positive press right now. And no one seems too concerned about the implications.

Short line railways haven’t been too far from the news since they had their western Canadian beginnings in 1986. That was when colourful and outspoken Alberta entrepreneur Tom Payne began Central Western Railway in, well, central-western Alberta. Three years later, Saskatchewan had a humble start in the short line business when Southern Rails Co-operative took over short sections of CN and CP track in southern Saskatchewan.

While Southern Rails is still operating, though not with all its original track, Central Western has gone the way of the dinosaur. The difference? Central Western was privately owned and failed to return enough to its investors to justify its continued operation. Southern Rails is community owned, and its owners benefit by its operation, not from a return on investment.

The story has repeated itself several times in Western Canada. Perhaps the worst and most striking example came when a company from Salt Lake City purchased the Miami and Hartney subdivisions in southern Manitoba in 1999. Local governments and farmers had organized tentatively to look at buying the line but never coalesced.

The Tulare Valley Railway, owned by rail salvager A&K Railroad Materials, convinced CN it could run the lines as a short line. By 2007, the track was gone and customers on the line were crying the blues.

It’s an interesting truth that neither Manitoba nor Alberta has a short line railway operating on a grain-dependent branch line at this time, while Saskatchewan has many, and the numbers increase yearly. As in the early beginnings, the difference is in ownership. Saskatchewan’s successful short lines are all community based. None are seen as investment vehicles. All are rather a means to an end – the end being the continuation of rail service for the benefit of the farmers and communities involved.

I won’t dwell on the lack of entrepreneurial spirit displayed by farmers in Saskatchewan’s

sister provinces. That would be a cheap shot. And I won’t mention the failure of governments in either Alberta or Manitoba to support community-based short line ownership, compared to Saskatchewan’s many efforts in this regards. That would simply be taunting the less fortunate. Besides, if recent news is any indication, that may be changing, at least in Manitoba.

The newly formed Boundary Trails Railway Company is the first short line in Manitoba to be largely owned by producers. It also received substantial aid from the provincial government, in the form of a $615,000 forgivable loan. Everyone involved, from farmers to the province has waxed eloquent about the benefits of a producer-owned short line.

All this is good. And it’s about time Manitoba farmers followed

the successful model from Saskatchewan. But now for the rain. The railway will be operated by another company, cited in press stories as the Central Canadian Railway, which will provide “car hauler, maintenance services, links with major railroads on traffic and delivery issues, snow clearing and basic administrative services.”

Most Saskatchewan short lines do most of this work themselves.

The simple fact is that there is seldom enough money available in moving grain on branch lines to afford extensive services from outside contractors. Many Saskatchewan railways learned this the hard way.

It is a bit of an odd way for farmers to do things. Few would consider hiring custom operators to carry out every bit of their farm operation, from seeding to bookkeeping. There would be very little left over if they did. The short line railway isn’t much different from a farm, and requires similar management. If times are tough, you watch every penny. Outside contractors have a different expectation, and often simply want to maximize their involvement and return.

I hope the new and optimistic owners of the Boundary Trails Railway have considered this.

On a related note, rumour has it the same company that consumed the Miami and Hartney subdivisions is poking around the Alliance subdivision in Alberta, and wants to talk to producers on that line, which CN has up for sale. Now that’s a parade that deserves a thunderstorm.

Paul Beingessner writes from his farm near Truax, Sask.

The post Community Ownership Key To Successful Short Lines appeared first on Manitoba Co-operator.

Bill C-13 has had a long history. It began as C-39, in December, 2007. It failed to make it through that Parliament and was reintroduced, in identical form, as C-13 in early 2009. Since reintroduction, it has been criticized by farm groups across Canada. That criticism arose, in part, because the government failed to change the bill at all, despite opposition from the ag community.

Throughout debate over the bill, the Conservative government has tried to sell it as an effort to “modernize” the Canadian Grain Commission. The agriculture minister, and others, have repeatedly said that the act hasn’t been amended for decades, but agriculture itself has changed immensely in that time. Hence, the act must be out of date.

The talk about modernization is clearly an attempt to influence farmers by using jargon. Modern is good after all. What farmers would not want to be modern? The government also talks about eliminating “unnecessary and costly regulations.” Sound good, eh? Farmers can ill afford anything unnecessary and costly.

But the bill fails dramatically to live up to its hype. Its proposed modernization includes ending the focus on furthering the interests of farmers. Rather than a regulator, the CGC becomes a service provider, working happily in the best interests of everyone. The bill ignores the fact that not everyone’s interests are the same, and not everyone has equal power. The Canada Grain Act has traditionally focused on producer interests for a reason – producers typically lack power as they face massive grain companies.

The unnecessary and costly regulation the bill intended to end consists of two things. One is getting rid of bonding for grain companies. This part of the act ensures farmers will get paid in case a grain company goes bankrupt. Despite Gerry Ritz’s comments that this hasn’t worked well, it has worked quite well for the most part. The government move to get rid of this requirement is based on the ideology of privatization, since there is no practical replacement for this bonding.

The Western Barley Growers Association was given huge sums of money by the government to develop an alternate mechanism, but has produced nothing concrete. Ritz appears not to understand the nature of laws when he says his government would not remove bonding until there was a substitute available. If C-13 had passed, bonding would be gone.

The second part of “unnecessary regulation” would have been the elimination of inward weighing and inspection at port. It is true that much of the grain that begins at an inland elevator ends at a terminal of the same ownership, but certainly not all. Take Prince Rupert for example. The terminal is owned by five grain companies. Do they trust each other enough to mingle their grain without independent inspection? Of course, there will be a need for inspection for things like producer cars.

The bill contemplated private inspectors. Would both sides accept the verdict? The CGC would still do inspections on outbound shipments, but the force of inspectors would be greatly reduced and much expertise lost.

The CWB would still require inward inspection for several reasons. It allows it to know what stocks are in the terminal, and allows it to capture a portion of the blending gains for farmers. Since CWB grain still constitutes the majority of grain exported, inward inspection would still be needed. Only the faces would change, with privatized inspection being the order of the day. Not much streamlining there.

Both COMPAS, the company that studied the issue for the feds, and the Standing Committee on Agriculture recommended the government set up an office of farmer advocacy, since the CGC would no longer have farmer protection as its main mandate, and since the government has apparently eliminated the assistant commissioners to the CGC by refusing to appoint any. The failure to set up this office has much to do with opposition party condemnation of the bill.

The Conservatives believe that getting rid of bonding, limiting farmer protections and reducing the scope of the CGC means they are modernizing it. Instead, it is just more of the same. Leave farmers to deal with the market, in an environment where they are divided and ultimately conquered. This might be the modern way, but it is hardly one we should aspire to.

Paul Beingessner writes from his farm near Truax, Sask.

The post Good Riddance To C-13 appeared first on Manitoba Co-operator.

Rhetoric aside, people don’t vote because they increasingly don’t think what governments do is relevant to their lives. They are wrong, but it may be that what governments do today is not as important as what they don’t do. In the last couple decades, governments have steadily and continuously eroded their own ability to intervene in the economic and social fabric.

Let me give you a couple of examples. In the United States, a drug manufacturer is asking to be allowed to use the drug cefquinome against respiratory infections in beef cattle. Cefquinome is from the family of cephalosporins, a relatively new family of antibiotics that is used in humans as a last line of defence against certain infections. Many medical groups in the U. S., including the American Medical Association, have urged the U. S. Department of Agriculture not to license the drug for animal use. The fear is that resistance to this class of antibiotics could be hastened by using them in livestock. The response of the USDA has been that the rules do not allow it to turn down the drug company’s request, no matter how well founded these fears might be.

The second example is also American. Last year, the Peanut Corporation of America continued to sell peanuts after salmonella contamination was found in its processing plant. It did not report this contamination to health authorities. It seems the Food and Drug Administration in the U. S. does not have the authority to compel such plants to turn over their inspection data. One bureaucrat thought it would not be wise to enact such a law because then companies might simply stop testing.

In Canada, governments have also been quick to limit their own powers. The issue of competition is a glaring example. Competition is essential to the working of a capitalist economy. Competition ensures that no one is gouged and that companies continue to seek out ways to be more efficient. You would think that competition would be absolutely sacred to a free enterprise government. Yet governments claiming to be devoted to that ideology seem to care little if effective competition in the marketplace exists.

For example, what farmer would deny that competition in the beef-packing industry is insufficient? With the consolidation of the packing industry into only three hands in Canada, the farmers’ share of the beef dollar has shrunk dramatically. The National Farmers Union pointed out the degree of this in a carefully researched study.

Presently, the Competition Bureau is examining a proposed sale that would reduce the number of major beef processors in Canada to two. The proposal would allow the sale of Tyson’s beef slaughter plant in Brooks, Alberta to XL Foods. XL already has a significant presence in Canada in cattle feeding and slaughter, and owns all the major livestock auction facilities in Saskatchewan. If the sale proceeds, Cargill and XL would control the slaughter of 95 per cent of the fed cattle in Canada. Few reputable economists believe you can have vigorous competition when there are only two competing firms in the market.

It is likely, however, that the Competition Bureau will allow the sale to go ahead, if its past track record is any indication of future actions. It had no qualms about allowing Cargill to buy Better Beef in Ontario. As a result, Ontario is now the lowest-priced market for cattle in Canada.

The National Farmers Union has insisted that the bureau make public its full analysis of the situation so that Canadians can see if the bureau’s analysis stands up to scrutiny. This too is unlikely if past behaviour at the bureau is any indication.

Lest you think the Competition Bureau is useless, however, rest easy. If you are hiring a school bus in Newfoundland, the bureau is right there at your side. In a recent ruling, the bureau found evidence of price fixing among school bus drivers and companies in Newfoundland.

Other than that, since 2005 the bureau has never failed to give its blessing to all and any mergers and acquisitions that came before it. It allowed appliance manufacturers, drug companies, steelmakers, newspapers, cellphone companies, all and sundry who came before it, to buy out their competitors. In all cases, the bureau’s response was the same: “Based on the information available, the bureau determined that the proposed transaction would not likely result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition in any of the relevant markets.”

There was one exception. In 2005,the Competition Bureau decided that Johnson and Johnson could not buy out the consumer health care business of Pfizer Inc. without some remedial measures. The reason? Diaper rash ointment. Johnson and Johnson would have had too big a share of the diaper rash ointment market. So, farmers need not despair. They will never be subject to market dominance should there be an outbreak of diaper rash among their cattle.

Paul Beingessner writes from his farm near Truax, Sask.

The post I’d Laugh If I Could Stop Crying appeared first on Manitoba Co-operator.

Of course, the financial sector isn’t the only one that is inadequately policed by the people who are supposed to be guarding the public interest. Consider the case of food safety regulators. Corrupt and stupid bankers can leave you penniless if left to their own devices, but corrupt and stupid food processors can leave you dead.

And so it was for the folks who imbibed peanuts in the United States last fall. Eight of them died, and 19,000 across 43 states became ill after eating peanut butter and processed foods containing peanuts contaminated with salmonella. Just as the financial collapse stemmed from a variety of causes, the peanut debacle points to a host of structural problems within the industrial food sector.

Most obvious is the lack of adequate regulations. In a twist that could only have been conceived by a peanut-brained politician, food safety rules in the U. S. require plants to test for contaminants like salmonella, but do not require them to inform the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the public if they find them.

In 2004, for example, foodprocessing giant ConAgra found salmonella in peanut butter from a plant in Georgia. ConAgra was exposed by a whistle blower from within the plant, but when the FDA asked for the inspection records, ConAgra refused. The FDA did nothing more, until three years later when hundreds of people became sick from tainted peanut butter made at the facility. It then demanded the records, which ConAgra insisted not be made public.

The peanut scandal in late 2008 came from a plant in Blakely, Georgia owned by the Peanut Corporation of America. Its abysmal safety record and failure to disclose again highlights the lack of proper regulation in the food industry, and the lack of resources to enforce the rules that do exist.

But it isn’t just health regulations that we’ve messed up royally. The Peanut Corporation of America only processes one per cent of the peanuts used in the U. S., yet its criminal carelessness affected people across the continent and around the world. The highly integrated industrial system that supplies us with food is in itself part of the problem.

Many American companies obtained peanut paste from Peanut Corp. for use in foods of all sorts. The scale of such plants means that foodborne contaminants from a single facility can reach thousands of miles and affect millions of people. It is the same with meat-processing plants, as people across the world have discovered. When contaminated hamburger was found to originate from a ConAgra slaughter facility in Greeley, Colorado in 2002, hundreds were sickened and 19 million pounds of ground beef were recalled from across the continent.

At least in the era when packing plants were local, a problem would be confined to a limited area. Today’s massive foodprocessing facilities can spread a problem around the world in a few weeks.

The financial mess and ongoing food safety issues are two areas that indicate a sophisticated, highly technological society cannot afford to push government to a peripheral role. Even the Grain Growers of Canada finally appears to understand that. In a recent press release, it called for the federal government to increase its investment in plant research.

The GGC has never been one to promote government involvement in anything. Its members are the first to complain about government “interference” in the marketplace. To its credit in this case, the GGC recognizes that private companies do varietal and crop research for their own benefit, not specifically for the benefit of farmers. Thus, private research is not much interested in diseases or insect pests that are restricted to certain areas. Nor do agronomic questions like how to reduce input costs concern the agribusiness giants.

Now, if the GGC could see that, we’ve also messed up the system that transfers publicly generated knowledge into the public sphere. When crop varieties are developed with public money, we then license them to companies that restrict their use by prohibiting seed saving and restrict farmers’ marketing options by tying the variety to exclusive contracts. Fixing this mess-up would ensure that public money really does benefit farmers.

Fixing the mess we are in means we need to elect politicians who understand the role governments have to play. We haven’t done such a good job on that either.

Paul Beingessner writes from his farm near Truax, Sask.

The post Government’s Role In Fixing The Mess appeared first on Manitoba Co-operator.

The mechanism is rather simple: when prices are high on the open market, the packer will dip into his own supply of cattle for slaughter. The lack of demand in the open market pushes prices down, at which point the packer returns to the auction house. This mechanism, along with secret contracts with some feedlots, leaves a lot of uncertainty as to the true market price for livestock.

But Obama has other ideas to reform agriculture as well. He has stated that he will impose a $250,000 payment cap on farm support payments to any individual farm. His policy document puts it like this: “Implement a $250,000 payment limitation so we help family farmers – not large corporate agribusiness. Close the loopholes that allow mega-farms to get around payment limits.”

If you want to improve the survival of family farms, a payment cap makes sense. Handing government money to large farms often simply finances their next round of acquisitions. Large farms get larger by buying out smaller ones. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the average taxpayer wants his tax dollars to carry out the concentration of agriculture in fewer and fewer hands.

Canadian governments have taken a different view on this. There were once limits on government payments to individual farms. Back in the days of NISA and CFIP, the limit was $425,000. I can guarantee that none of the farmers around here saw that amount of money. Yet, the provincial and federal minister of agriculture saw fit to raise this to $975,000 and later to $3 million. I assume that government actions represent an attempt to achieve some policy goals, but I am somewhat puzzled as to what rational goal a $3 million cap on payments is supposed to achieve.

Clearly, payments like this do not go to family farms. Nevertheless, some farmers have achieved mighty benefits from government largesse.

A look into the Public Accounts of Canada for 2004-05 reveals that Pallister Farms of Portage la Prairie, Manitoba collected $532,728 from Agriculture Canada’s Business Risk Management Programs. Pallister Farms is owned by well-known free-market advocate and anti-CWB activist Jim Pallister.

If Statistics Canada is to be believed, large farms in Canada generate greater net incomes than small ones. Recent analyses have even pointed out that there is little sign of a farm crisis on the largest Canadian farms. In light of this, it seems irresponsible of governments

to spend taxpayers’ monies on farms that don’t need it.

While we are not exactly in an era of fiscal restraint right now, what with government throwing money around like beads at Mardi Gras, we will be at some point when governments recognize that the kitty isn’t limitless. Like all government spending, agriculture will eventually come under scrutiny, to see if spending is achieving policy goals. Farmers and taxpayers need to clearly understand what those goals are. If the government simply wants to heave more money at those who have, subsidy caps are hardly necessary. If it wants to maintain family farms of a reasonable size, and ensure a future for family-based agriculture, subsidy caps make a lot of sense.

In addition to being fiscally responsible, limits on subsidies will ensure that taxpayers’ monies don’t simply add to the wealth of already wealthy companies and individuals.

Paul Beingessner writes and farms from his home near Truax, Saskatchewan.

The post Why support farmers who don’t need it? appeared first on Manitoba Co-operator.

Livestock industries? Well, no. With the exception of Alberta throwing a whack of money at its cattle farmers, other provinces and the federal government appear ready to turn a blind eye to an industry sinking into the ground.

It’s interesting to compare the situation of livestock producers to that of autoworkers. The auto industry in Canada exists largely because of a trade agreement with the United States, known as the Auto Pact. It shifted some auto manufacturing from the U. S., where most of Canada’s cars were made, to Canada, mainly Ontar io. The pact required that for every car sold in Canada, one had to be built here.

The cattle and hog industries in Canada, with their present levels of production, exist largely because of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Prior to this, Canada’s beef industry was mostly sized to fit domestic needs and the hog industry was similarly small. When Canadian livestock were allowed into the U. S. tariff free, our production began to grow. That was further accelerated by poor grain prices in the 1980s and ’90s. Marginal lands were converted back to grass and feed grains were cheap.

Both industries are in huge trouble today, and the government is bailing one of them out. Guess which one?

So why do provincial and federal governments in Canada see the auto industry as worth saving and the livestock industry as so much waste to flush down the toilet? The answer may lie in location and politics. The auto industry in Eastern Canada means seats for any government that wants to rule or keep ruling.

Ontario voters will go Liberal, Conservative or even NDP at the drop of a hat (or a dollar). Western voters, particularly rural ones, vote Conservative no matter what. The federal government seems totally uninterested in agriculture, with the exception of dumping the Canadian Wheat Board. Equally, in Saskatchewan, the governing party seems assured of rural votes. In return, it is ignoring Saskatchewan’s large livestock sector.

Here’s the awful irony. When the Liberals ruled Canada from an eastern base, they ignored western agriculture. Commentators would of ten say we should not expect good treatment from a party we refuse to vote for. Now the party we vote for is in power, and we still get nothing because they expect we will always vote for them.

The same dichotomy seems to be playing out in Saskatchewan. The NDP was largely estranged from rural Saskatchewan during its long reign. Now the Saskatchewan Party, solidly entrenched in rural Saskatchewan, categorically says it has no help for the livestock industry. (And the Saskatchewan Stock Growers Association president Jack Hextall says, darn it…oh well… okay.)

The exception to this perverse rule is Alberta. The reigning Conservatives have doled out big bucks to the livestock sector to keep it afloat.

To compound the situation, it is unlikely that pouring money into this industry would do much good in the long run anyway. A recent study by the National Farmers Union shows that livestock returns, which were relatively constant for many decades, took a tumble with the advent of NAFTA and the consolidation of the packing industry. The example of calf prices illustrates this. Prices for 500-to 600-pound calves today are just over half their 1942 to 1989 average.

So, following the advice of governments and the economic dictates of the time, farmers increased livestock production and packers consolidated. When the system fails, as it has today, governments are quite prepared to dump the farmer. But then, that has been the way of thinking in government for a long time. Farmers are the problem, the solution is to get rid of more of them and leave only the efficient. It’s so much easier than challenging the conventional wisdom about business and trade.

Paul Beingessner farms and writes from his home near Truax, Sask.

The post Government bailouts bypass livestock producers appeared first on Manitoba Co-operator.